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Neo-Rawlsian Fringes: A New Approach to Market Segmentation
and New Product Development
Avi Giloni, Sridhar Seshadri, and Christopher L. Tucci
Prior research into the link between new product development and market segmen-
tation has focused on two main approaches: (1) design, segment, and do limited
competitive evaluation; and (2) segment ﬁrst, design second. This paper proposes a
third approach, which is to simultaneously design, perform segmentation according
to beneﬁt and to evaluate against competitive designs. This research uses a beneﬁt
segmentation technique based on conjoint analysis (or other techniques that relate
product attributes to consumer utility) in which the segments emerge simulta-
neously with the design based on certain design principles or ‘‘strategies.’’ Herein a
method is proposed to narrow down the many possible feasible designs (combina-
tions of attributes) to a ﬁnite set and to examine the appeal of each design. Five
distinct design strategies are proposed for modeling and studying competitive re-
action. These include ‘‘traditional’’ ones such as differentiation and new ones whose
fringe customers have high utility. The paper shows that these ﬁve strategies are
adequate for modeling competitive reaction using simulation. Another contribution
of the paper is the way competitive reaction is modeled. In generating and evaluating
a design the desire herein is also to assess the defensibility of the design and include
it in the evaluation criteria. These issues are addressed by decomposing the solution
procedure into two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, different optimal designs are created
based on predeﬁned product development strategies. In the second, these optimal
designs are compared against one another with regard to market share and potential
to secure market leadership. This work shows that the nature of competition as well
as the variability of customer preferences are critical to how a strategy performs.
This process uncovers a surprisingly robust design strategy—developing attributes
such that a ‘‘lower fringe’’ is most satisﬁed—that even achieves market dominance
under certain conditions. This methodology is also applied to partworth data on
refrigerators, which provides a concrete example of the concepts and demonstrates
results consistent with the propositions developed earlier in the paper.
Introduction
E
ntry into new markets and incumbent reac-
tions are critically dependent on the product
design portfolio choices of ﬁrms. Prior re-
search in this general topic area has tended to focus on
mechanisms for generating and evaluating product
design choices and segmentation possibilities with
limited reaction by competitors. Such an approach
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designs the product taking into account the existing
portfolio of products as well as the resource con-
straints of the ﬁrm (see, e.g., Yano and Dobson,
1998). It is also common to assume in such an ap-
proach that competition is static and that any reaction
is restricted to price changes. In commenting on the
state of the art at the time, Choi and Desarbo (1994
p.451) stated that ‘‘despite [a] widely recognized need
for analyzing the dynamic effects of competition, few
methodological advances have been published thus
far to incorporate formal competitive models.’’ This
paper proposes an approach that starts to address
these concerns.
The approach is best explained through an exam-
ple. Consider the market for a personal digital assis-
tant (PDA). Different attributes for a PDA could be
handwriting recognition, weight, battery life, calendar
functionality, and price. The traditional method of
market segmentation involves collecting data about
customer preferences with regard to these attributes
using conjoint analysis or other methods (even virtu-
ally; see, e.g., Dahan and Hauser, 2002). Conjoint
analysis is used to measure partworth functions—that
is, the preference for attribute levels. The traditional
method continues by identifying segments, for exam-
ple, by using techniques such as cluster analysis. The
design of a PDA follows by tailoring its attributes to a
particular segment’s needs. For example, if it were
ascertained that students would not pay more than
$99 for a PDA, the ﬁrm would choose to design a
product for students that is cheaper but weighs more
or one that has reduced calendar functionality. The
ﬁrm, in addition, might consider the price reaction of
the competition. Some researchers have also consid-
ered the cannibalization of the sales of current port-
folio of products in the optimization problem.
This paper deviates from this approach in at least
two important respects. The ﬁrst is the way in which
various designs are arrived. A beneﬁt segmentation
technique is used that is based on conjoint analysis (or
other techniques that relate product attributes to con-
sumer utility) in which the segments emerge simulta-
neously with the design based on certain design
principles or ‘‘strategies.’’ A method is proposed to
narrow down the many possible feasible PDAs (com-
binations of attributes) to a ﬁnite set and to examine
the appeal of each PDA. For example, if one were to
maximize the sum of the utility derived by all clusters
of customers, the PDA could be said to appeal ‘‘on
average’’ to the clusters. Or, one might choose to de-
sign a PDA such that the sum of the utility of top 35%
of the users who like the design is maximized (no
matter what the rest of the potential market thought
of it). In this case, this would be called a design that
appeals to the ‘‘upper fringe.’’ Each such PDA thus
embodies a product development strategy, such as
maximize average utility or maximize the utility of
the upper fringe, and therefore yields a potential com-
petitive design. After identifying these potential de-
signs, the resulting products can be evaluated jointly
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or one on one in a simulation model or using exhaus-
tive enumeration to ascertain their defensibility.
Thus, the second way this research deviates from
prior approaches is the way competitive reaction is
modeled. In generating and evaluating a design, the
desire is also to assess the defensibility of the design
and to include it in the evaluation criteria. These is-
sues are addressed by decomposing the solution pro-
cedure into two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, different
optimal designs are created based on predeﬁned prod-
uct development strategies. In the second, these opti-
mal designs are compared with one another with
regard to, for example, market share and potential
to secure market leadership. Of course, a prerequisite
for doing this is to specify the set of product devel-
opment strategies. Therefore, the space of strategies is
an important input to this model.
An obvious product design strategy is to maximize
the average utility of all the users of the product. In
the PDA example, the objective of such a strategy is to
maximize the sum total of utility to all user clusters.
But a little thought reveals that there could be alter-
native strategies. This paper proposes four others that
are found to be theoretically interesting. Thus, this
paper analyzes the following ﬁve strategies: (1) aver-
age strategy, which maximizes the utility of all the
users; (2) upper fringe (or max-max) strategy, which
maximizes the utility of the users who love the prod-
uct the most; (3) lower fringe (or max-min or ‘‘neo-
Rawlsian’’) strategy, which maximizes the utility of
the users who like the product the least; (4) differen-
tiation strategy, which increases the utility of the larg-
est percentage of users with respect to a reference
product; and (5) threshold strategy, which raises the
utility of as many users as possible above a ‘‘thresh-
old’’ level. The ‘‘segment’’ such as those that dislike or
like a product the most is deﬁned endogenously in the
proposed approach, thus enabling the simultaneous
identiﬁcation of user segments with product design.
The proposed approach has the following beneﬁts.
First, it allows one to question whether a given strat-
egy is defensible to other strategies rather than
whether a given product is defensible to other prod-
ucts. For example, pharmaceutical companies lately
have pursued a strategy of reducing side effects of
blockbuster drugs, and occasionally (e.g., Tagamet
and Zantac) they have succeeded. This fast-following
side-effect-reducing product may represent a ‘‘lower
fringe’’ strategy because the users who like the prod-
uct the least are happier when the side effects are re-
duced, even if on average the product is no more
effective than the ﬁrst-to-market product. Note that,
as explained following, the users who dislike the ﬁrst
product the most may or may not be the same users
who dislike the second one. It is likely that successful
pharmaceutical ﬁrms prior to the 1980s did not an-
ticipate an attack from that direction. However, by
considering how competitors might enter the fray via
a lower fringe strategy, they might have avoided the
surprise. Second, this method allows one to explore
whether the neo-Rawlsian strategy is robust and
what product market conditions would best suit its
adoption.
Thus, this paper is an exploration of market seg-
mentation, technological trajectories, attackers’ ad-
vantages, and incumbent response using simulation as
a method of exploration. It proposes a new way of
thinking about product design, competitive evalua-
tion, and segmentation, which under certain circum-
stances might be more efﬁcient and beneﬁcial. The
paper explores the possibility of simultaneity in design
and beneﬁt segmentation, taking into account com-
peting designs. Additionally, the results of the simu-
lation demonstrate that segmentation is inﬂuenced by
how customers are aligned on two different dimen-
sions, namely, agreement on a reference product and
how easy it is to change the preference from this
product to another product.
This paper also elucidates the concept of product
utility as an outlier. In most analysis, the purpose of
identifying outliers is to eliminate or ignore them.
However, in many cases valuable segments can be
carved out of outlier analysis. Incumbents must pro-
tect themselves against product strategies aimed at a
fringe that captures disaffected customers. Thus, a
contribution of this paper is to show that decision
criteria such as max-max and max-min should be rou-
tinely considered in the product development process.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section
brieﬂy reviews the research streams previously men-
tioned. Then the model is outlined, and results from a
simulation analysis of the model and application to
real-life data are given. A discussion is then provided
of those results and how they relate to the literature.
The ﬁnal section concludes the paper.
Literature Review
There is a signiﬁcant amount of literature in the broad
area of product design. We concentrate on four topics
most relevant to this study: incorporating market
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feedback, modeling of price competition, defensive
strategies, and research and development (R&D)
portfolio selection.
Incorporating Market Feedback into Design
There has been extensive research in product design
especially with regard to new product development.
One area of research has focused on the use of con-
joint analysis to determine market segments and ap-
propriate or optimal product designs. Several papers
belong to this category, including Kohli and Krish-
namurti (1989); Green and Krieger (1991); Shi, Olafs-
son, and Chen (2001); and Srinivasan, Lovejoy, and
Beach (1997). Green and colleagues have contributed
to this literature since the early 1980s. For example,
Green and Krieger (1991) described a systematic ap-
proach to product design based on conjoint analysis.
They suggested developing a cluster based on either
buyer background characteristics or partworth pref-
erences and then designing the best product for each
segment. They also described several other ap-
proaches to designing products. They acknowledged
that the model does not provide insight into when
competitive reactions might take place and, further,
that the use of game theory for making such predic-
tions is in its infancy. Kohli and Krishnamurti (1989)
discussed the computational limitations of solving for
an optimal product design based on conjoint analysis
in the presence of a competitive market. They pro-
posed heuristics for choosing an optimal product de-
sign. The way the present research relates to this
literature is twofold. Although this modeling frame-
work is not based directly on conjoint analysis, it does
directly model customer preferences within the con-
straints of the maximization problems developed
herein. Furthermore, in the section titled ‘‘Applica-
tion to Refrigerator Data,’’ partworth data from con-
joint analysis is directly utilized within the proposed
models to explore nonprice (attribute) competitive re-
actions. Thus, this paper complements the literature
on conjoint analysis as it demonstrates its utility for
ﬁrms that may or may not have already conducted a
conjoint analysis.
Others have focused their research on concept test-
ing. Concept testing is the actual testing of various
new products or concepts that often can be quite
expensive, especially within the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Dahan and Mendelson (2001) studied new prod-
uct development in the presence of proﬁt distributions
that (possibly) have fat tails. They focused on the
problem of determining how many concepts should be
tested to maximize expected proﬁt. Their work is re-
lated to three existing themes: (1) determining the op-
timal number of concepts to test where they focus on
the testing various ‘‘concepts’’ in parallel; (2) the
modeling of product concepts as real options; and
(3) the various ways that the actual experimentation
may be conducted. Dahan and Mendelson’s contri-
butions are that they provided a new model of parallel
concept testing (motivated by previous literature) and
that they studied, modeled, and provided managerial
insights based on proﬁt uncertainty and focused on
the tail (including its shape) of the proﬁt distribution
via an extreme event perspective. In contrast, the
present research’s focus is one that is strategy driven
to determine optimal designs based on various objec-
tives including market share.
Price Competition
Although there has been much research on modeling
competition, almost all competitive evaluation has
been done through simulation and only for some clus-
ters with just two or three product attributes. The
present results are based on a new framework using
assumptions that are generally no more restrictive
than those found in the literature.
Yano and Dobson (1998) surveyed the literature
related to introduction of multiple products with a
view to maximize proﬁt. They separated this literature
into papers that model customer preferences based on
multidimensional scaling and those based on con-
structing a utility function via conjoint analysis. Re-
garding competitive positioning, they mentioned that
there are several papers in marketing on the problem
of introducing a single product to extend a product
line. They consider static external competition and
cannibalization across the ﬁrm’s product and do not
consider the cost functions of the ﬁrm or competitive
reaction (except for price). The papers that incorpo-
rate price competition include Choi, DeSarbo, and
Harker (1990), Horsky and Nelson (1992), and Choi
and DeSarbo (1994). They quoted Robinson (1988)
as saying that the most likely short-term reaction to
a new product is a change in price. They also sug-
gested that an area of opportunity to extend the prod-
uct design problems is to incorporate competition. It
is noted here that in contrast to the present frame-
work, at best, the models that they survey assume
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passive competition; that is, the competitors will not
change their product after the introduction of a new
product.
Choi and DeSarbo (1994) modeled price competi-
tion after a new product was introduced. They ex-
tended the model of Choi et al. (1990). Their paper
dealt with the case where a new product is introduced
and other ﬁrms react to it by changing their price. The
competitor could behave either strategically or ignore
the fact that competitors will adjust price. The anal-
ysis is made using a speciﬁc conjoint simulator. They
noted that ‘‘in most conjoint-based procedures, a
judgmental set of alternative concept proﬁles are
pre-selected and evaluated using a conjoint simula-
tor’’ (p. 453). Thus, the manager is assumed to have
selected a number of concept proﬁles to be evaluated
against existing brands. Choi and DeSarbo concluded
their paper with the result that when a competitor’s
price reaction is considered, a superior optimal prod-
uct proﬁle can be derived. The present methods are
applied to their dataset in the section titled ‘‘Model
Illustrations and Tests.’’
Defensive Strategies
Hauser and Shugan’s (1983) paper is one of the few
that considered competitive reaction other than price.
Within the restrictions described following, they dis-
cussed how ﬁrms with existing brands should react to
a new brand. This is termed defensive marketing strat-
egy. They assumed that the defending ﬁrm knows the
positions of existing products. The defensive actions
allowed are price, advertising, distribution, and prod-
uct improvement expenditures, but they did not con-
sider launch of me-too products. They stated that
analysis of equilibrium issues beyond existence of a
Nash equilibrium needs use of simulation even for the
simple cases studied by Lane (1980). Due to the com-
plexity of their model, they limited analysis to the di-
rection of response. Products are assumed to be
positioned in a multiattribute space; each consumer
chooses the product that maximizes his or her utility;
the utility is a concave function of a summary measure
that is linear in the product attributes (which results in
a single gradient for a local movement, unlike the
present model that permits different gradients); and
that awareness and availability can be modeled by
advertising and distribution response functions. Re-
garding product positioning, they suggested that if
tastes are segmented and if the competitors clearly
outposition the ﬁrm’s product in one customer seg-
ment, then a price increase may be optimal. However,
if consumer preferences are uniformly distributed,
then the defensive strategy should be to decrease
price, to improve quality to reinforce the product’s
strengths, and to advertise to announce these changes.
The present ﬁndings regarding the dimensions of ben-
eﬁt segmentation reinforce their conclusions.
Hauser and Gaskin (1984) tested the Hauser and
Shugan (1983) defender model as well as the assump-
tion that attributes are measured per dollar and that
customers have heterogeneous preferences. Hauser
(1988) further elaborated on the concept of defensive
marketing strategy. The main assumptions of Haus-
er’s model are that (1) consumers tastes are uniformly
distributed, for a ﬁxed price, (2) brand positions are
restricted to a quarter circle, (3) mature brands are in
the market and there is no entry or exit, (4) ﬁrms have
constant returns to scale, and (5) positions are sticky,
(i.e., brand positions do not change though ﬁrms
might move their product positions within this con-
straint). Hauser’s insights for three ﬁrms based on
systematic numerical experiments is that if the ﬁrms
do not anticipate price equilibria, then they tend to
position themselves close to one another, whereas
when they anticipate price competition they seek max-
imum differentiation. His results do not extend to the
four or ﬁve brand case.
R&D Portfolio Selection
Incumbents’ drive in developing new technologies has
important implications for the kinds of features that
eventually appear in the products and the kinds of
attributes associated with the products (Iansiti, 1995;
Krishnan, Singh, and Tirupati, 1999; Wheelwright
and Clark, 1992). For example, in the rigid hard-drive
industry, research into sealing the disk packs led to
much higher-capacity disk drives. In the pharmaceu-
tical industry, work on combinatorial chemistry has
completely changed the kinds of drugs developed.
And in the automobile industry, research in artiﬁcial
intelligence has led to better and more uniform paint
quality in cars. Thus, the choice of technological di-
rection has ultimate ramiﬁcations in the form the
product will take.
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) discussed the desir-
ability of managing the R&D portfolio through the
development of new technologies along two dimen-
sions: (1) how similar the product is; and (2) how
similar the process is. They emphasized that mapping
the product portfolio is a means to tracking the in-
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vestments currently under way and those planned in
the future to provide managers with information. Ul-
rich and Eppinger (2000) proposed four consider-
ations in evaluating and prioritizing R&D projects:
(1) competitive strategy (technology leadership, cost
leadership, customer focus, imitative); (2) market seg-
mentation (deﬁning the product with respect to a well-
known group of customers); (3) technological trajec-
tories (when to adopt or use a basic technology in a
product line); and (4) platform planning (which assets
to share across products). Scholars (e.g., Desai et al.,
2001; Krishnan et al., 1999) noted the interaction be-
tween these; speciﬁcally, they proposed that even
though platform planning could reduce costs, it may
constrain the ﬁrm’s ability to differentiate its product
(Desai et al., 2001) or to cover the market (Krishnan
et al., 1999). The goal of this mapping is to align the
product development process along these four dimen-
sions to ensure a good ﬁt with the company’s strategy.
Although all four are obviously important, the market
segmentation issue with respect to technology and
R&D is especially interesting. Also, even though the
issue is investigated in the marketing context, it is the
least studied of all of them with respect to technology
management (Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001, p. 14).
Further, Ulrich and Eppinger stated that in perform-
ing a market segmentation analysis, ‘‘the ﬁrm can as-
sess which product opportunities best address
weaknesses in its own product line and which exploit
weaknesses in the offerings of competitors’’ (p. 42).
The present research takes this one step further by
examining the potential response of a competitor as
well as the speciﬁc segmentation strategies most ame-
nable to sustainable market leadership.
If one looks at the prior research just cited in to-
tality, two interesting implications can be found. The
ﬁrst is that incumbents cannot respond easily to all
situations in which competitors or entrants develop
new technology. The second is that by designing ‘‘de-
fensible’’ products, ﬁrms may be able to take advan-
tage of competitors’ relative inertia (or difﬁculty
developing new capabilities) to gain some sustainable
advantage in the market. The following section intro-
duces a model of customer preferences and product
design so this can be explored further.
Model
The proposed model is discussed in this section. Many
of the assumptions are consistent with those made in
Hauser (1988) and Hauser and Shugan (1983). The
components of the model are the design objective, the
customer preferences, and technological constraints.
These are described next.
Customer Preferences
The product has p attributes. The value that attribute
i takes is denoted as xi. The design decision is to de-
termine the value xi for each of the p attributes of the
product. For example, a PDA can have a keyboard, a
screen of a certain size, a weight, and a price. Each of
these is an attribute and can take one of several val-
ues. It is possible that different combinations of at-
tribute values can be marketed as different grades of
the product. However, this research restricts attention
to the case when the ﬁrm’s problem is to design a
single product (i.e., to choose a single value for each
attribute). It is also assumed that the product cost is
restricted to be within a speciﬁed range. It is further
assumed that each xi has a lower bound, ‘i, and an
upper bound, ui, such that
li  xi  ui; for i ¼ 1; . . . ; p; ð1Þ
or, in matrix form,
l  x  u; ð2Þ
where l ¼ ðl1; . . . ; lpÞT ; u ¼ ðu1; . . . ; upÞT ; x ¼ ðx1;
. . . ;xpÞT , and given a matrix B, BT corresponds to
the transpose of matrix B.
Customers are assumed to fall into n clusters. Each
cluster comprises customers with homogeneous pref-
erences. The fraction of customer population in clus-
ter i is wi. Thus,
Xn
i¼1
wi ¼ 1; wi > 0: ð3Þ
Next, a utility function is constructed for each popu-
lation cluster. Without loss of generality, a reference
product is chosen, labeled as A. Let A’s p attribute
values be the vector a ¼ aj; j ¼ 1; . . . ; p
 
. Suppose
one is also given a product that has attribute values
x ¼ x1;x2; . . . ; xp
 
. Denote the utility derived from
this product by a customer in cluster i by ui (x). The
value of ui xð Þcan be expressed as
ui xð Þ ¼ ui að Þ þ
Xp
j¼1
pij I xj  aj
 h
nij I xj < aj
 
xj  aj
 i
;
ð4Þ
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where pij  0 is the marginal rate of change in utility of
a customer in cluster i for a unit increase in aj, and
nij  0 is the marginal rate of change in utility of a
customer in cluster i for a unit decrease in aj, and the
indicator function I( ) is
I xj  aj
  ¼ 1 if xj  aj;
0 otherwise

and
I xj < aj
  ¼ 1 if xj < aj;
0 otherwise:

Thus, in an extension of prior work, the utility is per-
mitted to change differently for positive and negative
changes in a speciﬁc attribute. Therefore, given a cer-
tain point in the attribute value space, the customers
within a cluster may value an increase in the value of
attribute j more (or less) than a decrease; that is, both
pij  nij and pij  nij are possible scenarios. Further-
more, it is allowed that customers in cluster i will
not purchase a product unless they derive a utility of
at least vi. This way, a reservation utility can be mod-
eled for the product.
Technological Constraints
The ﬁrm is assumed to operate under a set of tech-
nological, resource, and other constraints. Due to
this, not every design represented by (2) is feasible.
To model this, a production possibility frontier
(PPF) is used to represent the feasible set of design
(Hackman and Leachman, 1986; Leachman, 1979),
given by
Fx  b; ð5Þ
where F is an m  n matrix and b is an m  1 vector.
Included in this set of m constraints are budgetary
restrictions, as well as technological, capacity, and
regulatory constraints.
Design Objective
As mentioned already, the present work uses ﬁve
different objective functions to create up to ﬁve pos-
sible designs (it is possible that different objective
functions may occasionally lead to the same design).
Before the ﬁve strategies under consideration are
listed, additional deﬁnitions are needed. Let the util-
ity of the n clusters for a given product with attribute
values x be u1ðxÞ; . . . ; unðxÞ or
uðxÞ ¼
u1ðxÞ
..
.
unðxÞ
0
B@
1
CA
Let w ¼ ðw1; . . . ;wnÞ; that is, the vector of weights or
fractions is deﬁned similarly. Let [i] denote the cluster
that derives the ith lowest utility from the product
with attribute values x. Thus,
u½1ðxÞ      u½nðxÞ: ð6Þ
The ﬁve objective functions are now developed. Let
rðw; uðxÞÞ denote the objective function of the ﬁrm.
The ﬁve formulations (product development strate-
gies) are referred to as Maximize the Average Utility,
Maximize the Average Utility for the Upper Fringe,
Maximize the Average Utility for the Lower Fringe,
Differentiation, and Threshold. These are described in
detail next.
(i) (Average Design Strategy) Maximize the Aver-
age Utility. The objective function of the ﬁrm in this
case is to maximize the weighted sum of utilities.
Thus,
rðw; uðxÞÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
wiuiðxÞ: ð7Þ
(ii) (Upper Fringe Design Strategy) Maximize
the Utility for the Upper Fringe. The objective func-
tion is to choose ðn hþ 1Þclusters and x simulta-
neously so as to maximize the sum of the highest r 
100% utilities where r is a parameter of the optimi-
zation. Thus,
rðw; uðxÞÞ ¼
Xn
k¼h
w½ku½kðxÞ; ð8Þ
subject to the additional constraints that the sum
of the weights of the top n hþ 1 clusters is at least
r, but the sum of the top n h weights is less than r;
that is,
Xn
k¼h
w½k  r and
Xn
k¼hþ1
w½k < r: ð9Þ
(iii) (Lower Fringe Design Strategy) Maximize the
Utility for the Lower Fringe. The objective function is
to maximize the sum of the lowest r  100% utilities.
Thus, the problem is to choose the h clusters and x to
maximize
rðw; uðxÞÞ ¼
Xh
i¼1
w½ku½kðxÞ; ð10Þ
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subject to the additional constraints that
Xh
k¼1
w½k  r and
Xh1
k¼1
w½k < r: ð11Þ
These constraints are similar to the ones for the Upper
Fringe Design Strategy, except that they address the h
lowest clusters rather than the upper clusters.
(iv) (Differentiation Design Strategy) The objective
is to design a product that appeals to most customers
when it is compared with product A. Here,
rðw; uðxÞÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
wiuiðxÞ Ifui  uðaÞg; ð12Þ
where Ifx  x0g is the indicator function and thus
Ifx  x0g ¼ 1 if x  x0 and 0 otherwise.
(v) (Threshold Design Strategy) The objective is to
maximize the percentage of clusters whose utilities are
higher than their threshold values. Here,
rðw; uðxÞÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
wiIfui  vig: ð13Þ
Notice that in (ii) and (iii), the fringe is deﬁned as the r
 100% of the population that like a given product
the least (lower fringe) or the most (upper fringe). This
is in contrast with the use of demographics and psy-
chographics to segment a market.
The problem to be solved can now be formulated as
max rðw; uðxÞÞ
s:t:
uiðxÞ ¼ uiðaÞ þ
Xp
j¼1
½pij Iðxj  ajÞ
þ nij Iðxj < ajÞðxj  ajÞ for all i
Fx  b
l  x  u:
It should be noted that the model does not require the
same reference product for all customers. Rather, the
model permits a different reference product, ai , for
each customer (segment). Thus, a can be replaced with
ai , ai can be replaced with aij, and p
j
i and n
j
i can be
interpreted as the marginal increase or decrease in
utility for positive or negative changes in attributes
from the reference product, ai.
It is further noted that the proposed approach can
be easily extended to the situation where conjoint
analysis has already been performed and partworth
information has been collected or estimated. In such a
case, it is not necessary to explicitly model a reference
product, a. Second, all of the potential products that
have been utilized in the conjoint analysis should be
feasible from the perspective of engineering- or other
production-related constraints. Third, the differentia-
tion strategy previously mentioned does not seem
relevant since the analysis would no longer be with
respect to a particular reference product. In such a
case, the remaining four strategies can be employed by
a ﬁrm utilizing conjoint analysis initially where the
ﬁrm would want to maximize the following mathe-
matical program. In this program, it is assumed that
there are K attributes, where attribute k has nk levels,
and customer (segment) i gets beneﬁt pijk from level j of
attribute k. The mathematical program is
max rðw; uÞ
s:t:
ui ¼
PK
k¼1
Pnk
jk¼1
pijk for all i:
Model Illustration and Tests
An Illustration
In this section, the model is illustrated using a simple
product with two attributes. Then the ﬁve product
development strategies are analyzed using simulation.
A product with three attributes is then further con-
sidered, and, ﬁnally, the model is applied to real-life
data on refrigerators.
Before discussing the details of the experiment,
some visualizations of the utility provided by differ-
ent designs are presented. In the example in Table 1,
there are 20 clusters, and the product has two attri-
butes. Each attribute can assume any value between 0
and 10. The reference product is chosen arbitrarily to
have attributes a5 (7.75, 0.984). The initial utilities of
the clusters corresponding to the reference product
are shown in column 2. The utility derived by each
cluster for four different designs are shown in columns
3 through 6. The four designs are optimal with respect
to the Differentiation, the Average Design, the Lower
Fringe, and the Upper Fringe design strategies, re-
spectively.
Based on this, a market share is calculated for each
of these designs when they compete simultaneously
with one another. The present research assumes that
customers always buy the product that gives them the
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most utility, using Lancaster’s spatial choice model.
Other choice models have been proposed (e.g., Luce,
1959; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) to model choice
behavior. The Lancaster model is appropriate for
quantiﬁable characteristics and horizontally differen-
tiated products (Yano and Dobson, 1998). Our future
work will compare the designs for other choice models
as well.
For example, the Lower Fringe strategy’s design is
preferred by clusters 14–20 (numbers in bold in Table
1); the Upper Fringe strategy’s design is preferred by
clusters 1, 3, 7, 8, 11, and 12; Differentiation strategy’s
design is preferred by cluster 2, 4, 5, 6, and 9; and the
Average strategy’s design is preferred by clusters 10
and 13. The market share of a design is obtained by
adding up the weights of the clusters that prefer this
design over the others. The shares are shown at the
bottom of the table. One can similarly calculate the
market share for each design when matched up
against the other designs in a one-on-one competi-
tion. For example, the Lower Fringe is preferred by
clusters 14–20 when compared to the Average design,
earning it a relative market share of 36.5%. From this
illustration one can already appreciate why designing
to the lower fringe might sometimes be a good strat-
egy—in contrast, focusing on raising the average
utility or on increasing the utility of speciﬁc clusters
might leave a signiﬁcant fraction of customers
dissatisﬁed.
The Simulation
A comprehensive simulation study was conducted to
compare different design strategies in this section. At
the outset, it was observed that if customer prefer-
ences were completely homogeneous, then the average
design strategy should produce the one design that
best satisﬁes the entire set of customers, rendering
competition in product design moot. Therefore, the
intent of the experiments was to compare designs
under scenarios that have different levels and differ-
ent types of heterogeneity in customer preferences.
Given the novelty of the lower and upper fringe design
strategies, most of our attention rests on them in the
analysis.
Recall that the parameters of the model were as
follows: the number of clusters, n; the fraction of cus-
tomers in cluster i, wi; the number of dimensions of
the product, p; the fraction of customers that consti-
tute a fringe, r; the current product, A; the initial util-
ity of cluster i for product A, ui (a); and the magnitude
of change in utility for cluster i with respect to positive
and negative changes in dimension j, pij, and n
i
j . In
keeping with the intent of studying the impact of het-
erogeneity in customer preferences on product design,
the decision was made to only vary the weights, initial
utilities, and rates of change, that is, wi, ui (a), p
i
j , and n
i
j .
In all the experiments, the number of clusters n was
set equal to 20, which adequately models the potential
Table 1. Illustration of Market Share Computation
Weight (wi) Initial Utility Differentiation Average Lower Fringe Upper Fringe
0.020 1000.00 1020.64 1018.07 1014.44 1023.07
0.025 990.00 991.00 962.35 955.91 973.35
0.030 975.00 998.69 995.04 990.72 1001.04
0.045 925.00 916.05 888.08 883.27 896.88
0.060 900.00 884.75 847.69 841.81 858.69
0.070 870.00 865.72 841.76 837.14 849.96
0.080 850.00 879.10 878.26 873.76 884.26
0.055 835.00 872.10 889.18 887.43 889.98
0.040 815.00 808.53 790.06 786.97 795.76
0.050 800.00 836.42 858.46 857.90 857.26
0.090 750.00 775.79 786.49 785.02 787.49
0.030 725.00 744.36 751.20 749.83 752.40
0.040 710.00 747.24 771.82 771.69 769.82
0.080 690.00 763.80 817.91 818.85 811.91
0.075 620.00 750.20 854.20 857.73 840.40
0.050 580.00 704.45 803.88 807.25 790.68
0.050 560.00 663.36 740.99 742.71 731.89
0.040 540.00 668.38 773.02 776.96 758.62
0.040 510.00 640.68 745.45 749.08 731.45
0.030 500.00 627.63 733.48 737.79 718.48
Market Share 0.240 0.090 0.365 0.305
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heterogeneity of the customers. The size of r deﬁning
the fringe was set to be 0.35. Further, the mean values
of the remaining variables were kept ﬁxed at 10 for the
pij’s and the n
i
j ’s and at 1000 for the initial utilities. The
scenarios correspond to different levels of variability
in the previously provided parameters: The variability
in wi represents the possibly varying size of customer
segments. The variability in both the pij’s and the n
i
j ’s
represents the fact that the customers may appreciate
various magnitudes of change in utility for an increase
or a decrease in a particular product attribute. The
variability in ui (a) represents the differing initial util-
ities of the customer segments for the current product
A. This resulted in the eight scenarios shown in Table
2. Where the table shows ‘‘H’’ the variance is equal to
the square of the mean, and where the table shows
‘‘L’’ the variance is equal to one quarter of the square
of the mean. This allowed for a study of the effect of
variability, in both level and type, of customer pref-
erences on the defensibility of designs.
Although the proposed model is well deﬁned for
many product attributes, within the simulation study
(in the next section), only two or three product attri-
butes were considered. Indeed, two or three attributes
are acceptable for the following reasons. From the
mathematical modeling perspective, the major jump
in complexity is going from two to multiple dimen-
sions. Just as important, it becomes more difﬁcult to
measure the utility of products with many attributes.
The problem is that there may be an inverse relation-
ship in product capability and product usability with
an increase in the number of attributes. Thompson,
Hamilton, and Rust (2005) showed that even though
more product attributes are generally looked on fa-
vorably by consumers from the perspective of product
capability, product usability decreases in the number
of product attributes.
When there are two dimensions, the reference
product A was ﬁxed with attributes (a1, a2)5 (1,3).
The PPF in this case is given by a21 þ a2 ¼ 4. In the
experiments with three dimensions the reference prod-
uct A was ﬁxed with design (a1, a2, a3)5 (1.154, 1.154,
1.156) and the PPF was given by a21 þ a22 þ a23 ¼ 4.
The former PPFs represented a product for which one
attribute was relatively more difﬁcult to produce
at high levels compared with the other. The second
was the PPF for a product whose attributes are
equally hard to produce at each given level. The
qualitative results did not change appreciably due to
these speciﬁcations.
To simulate a scenario, values of wi, ui (a), p
i
j and n
i
j
for i equal to 1 to n and j equal to 1 to p were ran-
domly selected. This was accomplished by sampling
from a gamma distribution with the appropriate mean
and variance called for by the factorial design. Once
all parameters were determined, each of the ﬁve op-
timization problems was solved. Each scenario was
replicated 1000 times. In the next section, market
share was calculated according to both the methods
just described.
Market share for one-on-one competition. Table 3
shows the market share averaged over all eight sce-
narios for each design when it competes one on one
with other designs for p5 2. The Average design per-
forms the best on this metric. However, the Lower
Fringe design does almost as well. It captures 45.2%
of the market share when it competes with the Aver-
age and 50.1% when it competes with the Upper
Fringe design. Furthermore, when compared with the
Differentiation or to the Threshold design, the Lower
Fringe design captures approximately 57% and 73%
of the market, respectively. The results (not shown)
are similar for the three-dimensional case (p5 3).
Table 4 shows the average market share for the
Lower Fringe design for each of the eight experimen-
tal scenarios for the two-dimensional case, and Table
5 shows the three-dimensional case. It can be seen that
there is little variation across the scenarios in the
market share obtained by the Lower Fringe design
strategy when it competes with either the Upper
Fringe or the Average design strategy. On the other
hand, when competing against the Differentiation
or the Threshold design strategy, the Lower Fringe
design performs much better in scenarios 3 through 6
in the two-dimensional case. In these scenarios, (see
Table 2), the variances of the marginal rates of change
in utility (i.e., the variances of pij ’s and the n
i
j’s,) are
low. In fact, in the two-dimensional case the Thresh-
old and the Differentiation designs perform worse in
Table 2. Variability of Parametersa
Scenario Weights Preferences Initial Utilities
1 H H H
2 L H H
3 L L H
4 L L L
5 H L L
6 H L H
7 H H L
8 L H L
aH, high. L, low.
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these four scenarios when competing on a one-on-one
basis with the Upper Fringe or the Average design as
well. However, in the three-dimensional case, only the
Threshold design performs signiﬁcantly worse in sce-
narios 3 through 6. Thus,
Proposition 1: The Lower Fringe strategy is robust to
variability in customer preferences. It can result in high
market share in a signiﬁcant number of instances when
competing one on one with other product design strat-
egies.
Proposition 2: In one-on-one competition, the Thresh-
old strategy is unlikely to capture a large market share
when the population is relatively homogeneous.
Market Dominance in One-on-One Competi-
tion. Another useful criterion for comparing designs
is to tabulate the frequency with which a given design
captures more than 50% of the market. This is labeled
as ‘‘market dominance.’’ Table 6 shows the frequency
of market dominance for the Lower Fringe design
strategy for each scenario when p5 2. It can be seen
that the relative performance of the Lower Fringe de-
sign vis-a`-vis the Average design is better in scenarios
7 and 8 than in the other six scenarios. Referring to
Table 2,
Proposition 3: When competing with the Average strat-
egy, the performance of the Lower Fringe strategy is
better when the initial customer utilities are close to one
another (low variance) and the marginal rates of
change in utility vary considerably.
This paper now explores whether or not the perfor-
mance of the Lower Fringe design strategy improves
as the variance of the marginal rates of change in-
crease while the variance of the initial customer util-
ities is unchanged. Figure 1 shows the results of
simulations in which the variance of the marginal
rates of change is increased systematically while keep-
ing the other parameters unchanged. Each point in
this ﬁgure corresponds to the fraction of 1000 runs in
which the lower fringe strategy achieved greater than
50% market share for that value of variance. The ﬁg-
ure clearly demonstrates that the frequency of market
dominance increases with increase in the variance of
the marginal rates of change of customer preferences.
This provides an insight into how the Lower Fringe
strategy design becomes competitive: Customers like
Table 3. Average Market Share on a One-on-One Basisa
Market Share of . . .
Average Upper Fringe Lower Fringe Differentiation Threshold
Against . . .
Average 0.5 0.451 0.452 0.403 0.252
Upper Fringe 0.549 0.5 0.501 0.434 0.259
Lower Fringe 0.548 0.499 0.5 0.430 0.262
Differentiation 0.597 0.566 0.570 0.5 0.377
Threshold 0.748 0.741 0.738 0.623 0.5
a p5 2.
Table 4. Market Share of Lower Fringe Strategy When
Competing One on Onea
Average
Upper
Fringe Differentiation Threshold
Scenario 1 .455 .501 .537 .668
Scenario 2 .457 .506 .523 .666
Scenario 3 .451 .498 .611 .814
Scenario 4 .452 .501 .605 .809
Scenario 5 .442 .496 .623 .809
Scenario 6 .451 .507 .607 .821
Scenario 7 .450 .497 .523 .660
Scenario 8 .458 .504 .531 .653
Average
Market Share .452 .501 .570 .738
a p5 2.
Table 5. Market Share of Lower Fringe Strategy When
Competing One on Onea
Average
Upper
Fringe Differentiation Threshold
Scenario 1 .427 .505 .463 .826
Scenario 2 .432 .506 .463 .819
Scenario 3 .429 .506 .462 .953
Scenario 4 .426 .502 .458 .947
Scenario 5 .422 .504 .471 .943
Scenario 6 .418 .496 .461 .952
Scenario 7 .431 .504 .472 .797
Scenario 8 .430 .503 .457 .799
Average
Market Share .436 .502 .470 .839
a p5 3.
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the initial (reference) product, but there is disagree-
ment among them about how the product can best be
improved. When there is higher variance, it is easier to
create a direction of improvement that may be over-
looked by product designers following other design
strategies. This is further discussed in the ‘‘Discussion
and Conclusion’’ section.
Market Share for Simultaneous Competition. Ta-
bles 7 and 8 show the average market share of each
design when all designs compete simultaneously (i.e.,
all together) in both the p5 2 and p5 3 cases. It is
remarkable that the Average design strategy, which
performed quite well in one-on-one competition, per-
forms quite poorly in this test when compared with
other strategies. The Lower Fringe design strategy
performs relatively well (on the average it captures
nearly 22% of the market share where p5 2 and does
even better where p5 3 with nearly 27%). However,
when p5 2, the Differentiation design strategy has
greater share compared with the Lower Fringe strat-
egy in all scenarios; likewise, the Threshold strategy
dominates when the variance of pij’s and the n
i
j’s are
high (Scenarios 1, 2, 7, and 8).
Instead of comparing average share over all repli-
cations, the research now compares how often a de-
sign wins. To do so, the frequency is tabulated with
which each design has the highest, the second highest,
and the lowest market share, (Table 9). When p5 3,
the Lower Fringe design stands out as the design that
has the highest market share the most often. A more
detailed analysis across scenarios reveals that the
Threshold design has signiﬁcantly lower market share
in scenarios 3 through 6. Thus,
Proposition 4: The Lower Fringe strategy is robust
across multiple scenarios of customer preferences as
well as competition (one on one or all together).
Proposition 5: When several design strategies compete
in the market, the Threshold design is unlikely to cap-
ture a relatively large market share when the popula-
tion is homogeneous.
Table 6. Frequency that Lower Fringe Strategy HasMarket
Share of at Least 50% in One-on-One Competitiona
Average
Upper
Fringe
Differentiation
Design Threshold
Scenario 1 359 518 605 843
Scenario 2 337 529 588 883
Scenario 3 327 519 800 994
Scenario 4 306 516 796 980
Scenario 5 321 494 796 967
Scenario 6 350 540 749 984
Scenario 7 367 493 555 839
Scenario 8 373 528 590 875
Average
Market Share 342.5 517.125 684.875 920.625
a p5 2.
Frequency of market dominance
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Figure 1. Frequency that the Lower Fringe Design Dominates
the Average Design for Various Variances of the Marginal Rate
of Change
Table 7. Average Market Share in Simultaneous
Competitiona
Average
Upper
Fringe
Lower
Fringe
Differentia-
tion Threshold
Scenario 1 0.131 0.219 0.211 0.222 0.217
Scenario 2 0.121 0.206 0.193 0.246 0.234
Scenario 3 0.160 0.226 0.225 0.271 0.118
Scenario 4 0.148 0.223 0.222 0.284 0.123
Scenario 5 0.166 0.241 0.225 0.261 0.107
Scenario 6 0.152 0.238 0.236 0.267 0.106
Scenario 7 0.126 0.216 0.203 0.229 0.227
Scenario 8 0.121 0.208 0.205 0.230 0.237
Average
Market Share 0.141 0.222 0.215 0.251 0.171
a p5 2.
Table 8. Average Market Share in Simultaneous
Competitiona
Average
Upper
Fringe
Lower
Fringe
Differentia-
tion Threshold
Scenario 1 0.160 0.257 0.250 0.226 0.107
Scenario 2 0.152 0.244 0.251 0.234 0.120
Scenario 3 0.168 0.282 0.283 0.237 0.030
Scenario 4 0.173 0.279 0.279 0.234 0.035
Scenario 5 0.179 0.277 0.288 0.224 0.031
Scenario 6 0.180 0.286 0.283 0.222 0.029
Scenario 7 0.152 0.251 0.255 0.224 0.119
Scenario 8 0.149 0.254 0.241 0.226 0.130
Average
Market Share 0.164 0.266 0.266 0.228 0.075
a p5 3.
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It is thus observed that the design strategies that per-
form well in one-on-one competition are not always
the best ones to adopt when there are multiple players.
In particular,
Proposition 6: The performance of the Average Strat-
egy is signiﬁcantly worsened when several design strat-
egies compete in the market compared to one-on-one
competition with any of the competing strategies.
In other experiments not reported here, we investi-
gated whether distinct designs simultaneously supe-
rior to all of these ﬁve exist. Quite surprisingly, the
best design in all-together competition either coin-
cided with one of the ﬁve or it was within a small dis-
tance of at least one of the ﬁve in the attribute value
space. Further, there seems to be no other apparent
systematic method of producing designs that are su-
perior to the ﬁve studied here.
Application to Refrigerator Data
This section applies the model to conjoint analysis
data on refrigerators from Choi and Desarbo (1994).
There are ﬁve attributes: (1) Brand name, Capacity,
Energy Cost, Compressor Type, and Price. The levels
of the various attributes are listed as follows: (1)
Brand name: General Electric, Sears/Kenmore,
Whirlpool; (2) Capacity (in cubic feet): 22, 21, 20,
19; (3) Energy cost (annual in dollars): 70, 80, 90, 100;
(4) Compressor: extremely quiet, somewhat quiet,
somewhat noisy, extremely noisy; (5) Price (in dol-
lars): 700, 850, 1000, 1150. The threshold strategy,
upper fringe strategy, and average utility strategy all
select the optimal product as General Electric, 22 cu-
bic feet, annual energy cost of $70, Extremely Quiet
Compressor, and a price of $700. On the other hand,
the lower fringe strategy selected the same product
except with the brand name Sears/Kenmore. The
same results were obtained for fringe sizes from
10% to 35% and for threshold values below 5.
When the threshold value is 5 or more, the threshold
strategy selects the optimal product to be General
Electric, 22 cubic feet, annual energy cost of $70, Ex-
tremely Quiet Compressor, and a price of $1000. This
section describes the case where the fringe value is
30% and the threshold value is 4.
Figure 2 depicts the utility maps of four different
designs. Each point in each column represents the
utility of at least one customer; thus, each column
shows all the unique utilities of the whole population.
The ﬁrst column shows the utilities of all the customer
clusters for the design chosen by the lower fringe
strategy. The next column shows the utilities for the
one design chosen by the other four strategies. The
third column shows the utility of a random design,
and the fourth column shows the utilities of a subop-
timal improvement on the random design. In this da-
taset, it appears that the population of customers have
rather similar preferences (e.g., none of the customer
clusters prefers Whirlpool to Sears).
It turns out that when making one-to-one compar-
isons with the other strategies, the lower fringe strat-
Table 9. Frequency of Market Share Ranka
Average Upper Fringe Lower Fringe Differentiation Threshold
Lowest Market Share 0.243 0.059 0.0669 0.087 0.544
Fourth Quintile 0.299 0.116 0.115 0.189 0.28
Third Quintile 0.193 0.221 0.210 0.267 0.110
Second Quintile 0.125 0.292 0.293 0.241 0.049
Highest Market Share 0.140 0.312 0.315 0.215 0.018
Average Rank
1 lowest, 5 highest 2.619 3.683 3.674 3.308 1.716
a p5 3.
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Figure 2. Utility Maps of Four Different Designs
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egy always provides a slightly lower market share.
This is because the design that the other strategies se-
lected (as previously mentioned, they each proposed
the same design based on different criteria) is pre-
ferred by 144 of the 393 customers, 123 customers are
indifferent, and 126 customers prefer the lower fringe
design. Thus, in one-to-one comparisons, roughly
52% of the customers prefer the other design, whereas
48% prefer the lower fringe design. However, when
making multiple comparisons simultaneously, since
there are only two unique optimal designs, the lower
fringe strategy obtains the highest market share. Here,
it is calculated that the lower fringe strategy is pre-
ferred by 40% of the customers whereas the other
three strategies each get a share of 20%. The market
share of the lower fringe strategy is lower because
when the customers are indifferent to all four of the
designs (or three of the designs), it is assumed that
market share of indifferent customers is shared
equally among the designs for which customers are
indifferent. It is noted that when the threshold value is
5 or above, the lower fringe strategy selects a design
that is superior to the threshold design, and when
multiple comparisons are made, the results are similar
to those already given in the sense that the lower
fringe strategy out performs the others. This illus-
trates Proposition 6 in that the lower fringe strategy
performs better when there are multiple comparisons
and also that the average strategy performs poorly in
the presence of multiple comparisons. Also, via the
lower fringe strategy, one is able to design a new
product that is very competitive and can gain a larger
market share than one might have thought possible.
Discussion and Conclusions
As shown herein, it possible to design a product
whose attributes and therefore eventual market seg-
ments emerge as a result of analysis of many possible
combinations of user preferences. The result of such
an analysis provides the ability to compare different
design strategies that ordinarily might be overlooked.
For example, the Lower Fringe design strategy per-
forms rather well against other design strategies when-
ever multiple designs compete for market share. What
about those markets in which only one other design
strategy is used? The present research reveals that
the Lower Fringe strategy can outperform even the
Average design strategy when two conditions are met:
(1) there is high variance across clusters in the rate at
which customer preferences change (i.e., there is wide
disagreement among the clusters about changes in the
value of the product’s attributes); and (2) there is low
variance within population clusters with regard to the
desirability of the reference product, which for these
purposes can be thought of as an incumbent’s initial
product. These outcomes are depicted for a product
with two attributes in Figure 3. The darker þ shows
the initial value obtained by customer clusters, and
the lighter þ depicts the subsequent value for each
cluster due to the change in design.
The ﬁrst part of Figure 3 shows no general agree-
ment about the reference product’s desirability in the
general population, called here ‘‘high variance in ini-
tial utility, sensitivity to change less important.’’ The
reason it does not matter whether the variance in sen-
sitivity to change is high or low is that when the initial
utilities are so highly dispersed, further movements,
whether large or small, do not affect the dispersion of
utilities much. Thus, it becomes very difﬁcult to make
much of a market out of a shift in the product’s at-
tributes.
The second part of Figure 3 demonstrates a more
promising situation. Here the population is not dif-
fuse at all with respect to the reference product, but
some consumers are highly sensitive to changes in the
product’s attributes. In the discussion of Proposition
3, it was demonstrated that under such circumstances,
the new product designed to raise the utility of the
fringe users who like it the least has the potential to
appeal to many users, depending on the dimension on
which the new technology improves. What this dem-
onstrates is that the Lower Fringe design strategy
does not just win over those consumers who like it the
least but also wins over those who happen to be sen-
sitive to design changes, even those who may be rel-
atively pleased with the reference product.
The third and fourth parts of Figure 3 represent
situations in which the new product based on the
Lower Fringe design strategy is less likely to do well.
Even though there is a tight cluster in both (c) and (d),
consumers are not very sensitive to changes in the
value of product attributes. Observe that variation
has two dimensions: the magnitude by which a change
can be effected, and the direction in which the change
can be made. In (c), the magnitude by which the de-
sign changes consumer preferences is small, and, thus,
it is difﬁcult to do better than the initial product. In
(d), even though the change is substantial, there is not
much variation in the direction of change—consumers
are highly sensitive to change but in the same direc-
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tion. In both these cases, designing a product that
raises the average utility of all users will out perform a
Lower Fringe design strategy almost all of the time.
Why? Because by raising the average utility of the us-
ers, the new product does not segment the market,
but, rather, the entire market migrates to the new
product. The Lower Fringe strategy does not quite do
as good a job of capturing a large market share in
such a scenario.
Figure 4 summarizes the results of the simulation
study in markets with two players and vis-a`-vis the
Average design strategy. Combining the two factors
previously outlined, it can be seen that there are four
possible combinations: (1) high variance in initial util-
ity and high variance in sensitivity to changing attri-
butes; (2) high variance in initial utility and low
variance in sensitivity to changing attributes; (3) low
variance in initial utility and high variance in sensi-
tivity to changing attributes; and (4) low variance in
initial utility and low variance in sensitivity to chang-
ing attributes. The results suggest that when played
one on one against the other design strategies, the
Lower Fringe design strategy is likely to come out
Figure 3. Schematic: How Consumers Appreciate a Product and Changes to Its Attributes
Figure 4. Schematic: Lower Fringe Strategy versus Average
Strategy in Different Markets
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ahead when there is low variance in initial utility and
high variance in sensitivity to changing attributes. We
believe that markets for pharmaceuticals (where reac-
tions to drugs and side effects can create highly differ-
ent sensitivities to changing attributes), PDAs, cell
phones mobile devices (where reactions vary widely
depending on Internet access versus e-mail versus
wide screens versus the ability to make phone calls),
and early calculators (where functions versus weight
versus size can be grouped) represent more favorable
and defensible markets if employing a lower fringe
strategy. Something else in common between these
markets is that in addition to being sensitive to
change, consumers may change preferences quickly
(cf. Bhattacharya, Krishnan, and Mahajan, 1998).
Though this issue is not modeled directly in the pres-
ent paper, this work is complementary to Bhatta-
charya et al.’s (1998) in that during the process of
designing the product and letting the segments
emerge, the ﬁrm is delaying the deﬁnition of the prod-
uct until some uncertainty about the new market is
resolved.
If one assumes that entry into markets based on
new technology cannot be instantaneous, then there
are four main implications of the study related to the
notion of ‘‘design for defensibility.’’ The ﬁrst is that a
Lower Fringe design strategy may mean the ﬁrm must
develop new technology to serve that fringe. This
technology is likely to be different from competitors’
for the very reason that it is designed to serve a differ-
ent type of group. This leads to the second implica-
tion, which has to do with the ‘‘resource-based view of
the ﬁrm.’’ If the ﬁrm is uniquely capable of serving the
Lower Fringe relative to competitors, then the ﬁrm
may ﬁnd itself in an advantageous competitive posi-
tion for some time. The third implication is that the
Lower Fringe design strategy has more of the element
of surprise to it. As asserted already, if it is not the
ﬁrst order of business in many ﬁrms’ R&D portfolios,
incumbents maybe caught off guard by an entrant’s
pursuit of a product with different attributes than an-
ticipated.
One limitation of this study is that the analysis does
not explicitly model entry and exit costs. Thus, it is
not possible to speak of an equilibrium condition in
which different designs could be added or withdrawn
from the market either sequentially or simultaneously.
Instead, a more limited form of competitive response
is being studied in which different designs are intro-
duced into the market simultaneously and then com-
pete head to head in a one-shot game. This sort of
response is, however, one additional step beyond a
price response (e.g., a price cut in response to market
entry).
The Lower Fringe strategy, though not perhaps the
optimal strategy in terms of overall attractiveness to
consumers (i.e., performance along the attributes cur-
rently valued in the market), may actually be the
strategy that can maximize market share. The reason
this strategy may be overlooked by incumbents is
probably due to the interpretation managers place on
designing a better mouse trap. They may feel that it
makes more intuitive sense to raise the average utility
(make cutting-edge personal computers) rather than
the fringe’s utility (a friendlier and more rugged com-
puter). However, raising the fringe’s utility captures
not only the fringe itself but also some of the main-
stream users who like the alternative attribute devel-
oped in the process. Furthermore, when a ﬁrm designs
a product that satisﬁes the upper or lower fringe, the
design performs quite well in markets where other
ﬁrms compete on different strategies.
Thus, designing a product whose fringe is happiest
may attract customers from all ranges of satisfaction
with the incumbent’s initial offering. This research
therefore sees the potential importance of not prede-
ﬁning the market segments that matter but rather
allowing them to emerge through a process of simul-
taneous development and regrouping. Of course, de-
sign strategies cannot be resolved in isolation. In
addition to the manufacturability of a new product
and the competitiveness of the new product, ﬁrms
may consider the ability of competitors to respond to
the new product. An analysis of different design strat-
egies as outlined in this paper may allow the ﬁrm not
only to design something novel but also to keep com-
petitors at bay.
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